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"A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words":
The Effect of Spectators' Display of Victim
Photographs During a Criminal Jury Trial on
a Criminal Defendant's Fair Trial Rights
by ELIZABETH LYON*
The victim was a person-someone you can picture.
Jack Collins, Former New Jersey Assembly Speaker'
I think they're probably a problem.
Stephen Breyer, United States Supreme Court Justice,
discussing the photograph buttons at issue in Carey v. Musladin
2
Introduction
Spectators at criminal jury trials have been known to display
photographs of a deceased victim inside the courtroom either on buttons, T-
shirts, collages, or through other means.' Courts have recognized that these
photographs function as no more than an ordinary "expression of the grief
occasioned by the loss of the victim." 4 As such, courts have allowed them
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.A. Psychology,
University of California, Davis, 2004. The Author would like to thank Professor Evan Lee for
reading several drafts of this Note and raising thought-provoking questions on both sides of the
argument.
I. New Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center Website, http://www.njcvlc.org/reference/
quotes/.
2. Transcript of Oral Argument 28, Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (No. 05-785).
3. This issue often arises in cases where the defendant is on trial for the murder of the
victim, and family or friends of the victim attend the criminal jury trial in support of the deceased
victim.
4. See, e.g., Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The California
Court of Appeal justified its rejection of Musladin's claim as follows: . . . 'the message to be
conveyed by the [victim's] family wearing buttons is less than clear. The simple photograph of
[the victim] was unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything other than the normal grief
[517]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
inside the courtroom just as many other emotional expressions of spectators
are allowed and even expected.5
This Note argues that victim photographs in the courtroom go beyond
an ordinary showing of emotion. In addition, they serve to elicit sympathy
from jurors, and they call the jurors to vindicate the victim's loss. For
these reasons, such photographs violate a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial.6 Yet, state courts have routinely allowed
spectators to display photographs of the victim during a criminal
defendant's jury trial, even over the defense's objection.7 These courts
underestimate the effect such photographs can have on a jury and, in the
process, have infringed on the right of the defendant to obtain a fair trial by
an impartial jury, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Recently, in Carey v. Musladin, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the "effect on a defendant's fair-trial rights of [spectators
bringing photographs of the victim into the courtroom] is an open question
in our jurisprudence." 8 In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, state
courts continue to allow in such photographs. Further, federal courts are
prohibited from granting relief under Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA") where a criminal defendant's rights have been
violated in state court on such grounds. 9 Thus, the Supreme Court should
occasioned by the loss of a family member."' (quoting People v. Musladin, No. H015159, slip op.
at 21-22 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1997))).
5. Compare, e.g., Bums v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 604-05 (Fla. 1992) (finding that widow
crying three times in courtroom insufficient to prejudice jury), with Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d
384, 389 (Fla. 1998) (stating that "where prejudicial exhibition [of emotion] 'extreme,' new trial
warranted" (citing Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454 (11 th Cir. 1991))).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
8. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006). Because of the procedural stance of this
case, the Supreme Court did not reach this issue. Id. at 77.
9. See, e.g., Joseph M. Brunner, Negating Precedent and (Selectively) Suspending Stare
Decisis: AEDPA and Problems for the Article 111 Hierarchy, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 307, 336 (2006)
("This [lower federal court] has determined that the New York Court of Appeals' decision was
(plausibly) erroneous. Thus, [the defendant] had a constitutional right that was probably violated
at his trial. Nevertheless, the AEDPA standard prevents a court from remedying that violation
because the Supreme Court has not yet specifically recognized such a violation. If this [lower
federal court] determines that [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment right was violated, then, that
determination would be rendered ineffective and meaningless by the operation of the AEDPA
standard. Once Congress has decided to establish lower Article Ill courts, Plaut [v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995),] and [City oA] Boerne [v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),] make
clear that lower Article II courts' judgments must be given ordinary precedential and stare
decisis effect. Plaut especially supports the proposition that any Article III court must have the
ability to conclusively and authoritatively decide a case. Denying a court the ability to craft a
remedy is an unconstitutional infringement on the judicial power an Article Ill court exercises.").
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address this issue in order to ensure that criminal defendants are afforded
their full constitutional rights.
Specifically, this Note will suggest that the Supreme Court should
adopt a rule prohibiting spectators from displaying victim photographs in
the courtroom during a criminal defendant's jury trial. First, it will look at
the Court's decision in Musladin and other state court decisions dealing
with victim photographs inside the courtroom, noting that many courts are
allowing such photographs. Next, this Note will address the history and
importance of the criminal defendant's fair trial rights under the Sixth
Amendment, including the right to an impartial jury, and argue that
displays of a victim's photograph in the courtroom infringe on these rights.
Moreover, this Note will address counterarguments, including the First
Amendment and the state's interest in allowing victims an outlet to express
their emotions including grief and solidarity with the victim. Last, this
Note suggests that, in light of the need to ensure all defendants are afforded
their constitutional right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule prohibiting spectators
from displaying photographs of the victim during a criminal jury trial.
I. Background Cases
A. Carey v. Musladin
In Carey v. Musladin, the defendant, Mathew Musladin, was charged
in state court with the first-degree murder of the victim, Thomas Studer.
10
At trial, there was no dispute as to whether Musladin was the individual
who fatally shot Studer." However, Musladin plead not guilty, arguing
that he was acting in self-defense when he shot the victim.i2
During at least some of the fourteen days of Musladin's trial,
spectators sitting in plain view of the jury wore buttons depicting a
photograph of the victim.' 3 Early on, Musladin's counsel moved to have
the buttons removed from the courtroom, but the trial judge denied the
motion.' 4 The jury convicted Musladin of first-degree murder. 5 Musladin
appealed his conviction.' 6 The California State Court of Appeals affirmed




14. Id. at 72-73.
15. Id. at 72.
16. Id. at 73.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Musladin's conviction, and Musladin then appealed to the California
Supreme Court, which denied his petition for review.'
7
After exhausting his state court appeals, Musladin filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California under AEDPA, arguing that the photograph buttons
displayed by the spectators violated his constitutional fair trial rights.1
8
Under AEDPA, a federal court may overturn a state court conviction only
where the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law."' 9 The federal
district court denied the petition.2°
Musladin then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.2' In his appeal, Musladin contended that under the Supreme
Court's holdings in Estelle v. Williams22 and Holbrook v. Flynn,23 the
photograph buttons worn by spectators during his criminal jury trial created
an "unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play.,
24
Musladin argued that the buttons were both a statement from the spectators
regarding his guilt and a plea to the jury to convict him, thereby infringing
on both his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and a presumption of
innocence.2 ' Thus, he argued the buttons were inherently prejudicial
because their presence violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.26
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Musladin and reversed the district
court's denial of Musladin's petition for writ of habeas corpus and
remanded.27 The Ninth Circuit found that the state appellate court correctly
identified the "inherent prejudice" test of Williams and Flynn as the clearly
established federal law to apply in this case.28 Under the "inherent
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2007).
20. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 73.
21. Id.
22. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
23. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
24. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 654, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2005). See infra notes 49-
80 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Williams and Flynn.
25. Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 31-32, Musladin, No. 03-16653 (9th Cir. Nov.
4, 2004).
26. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 654, 656-57.
27. Id. at 654.
28. Id. at 656-58. Musladin's petition for habeas corpus was based on the grounds that the
state appellate court unreasonably applied Williams and Flynn. Thus, the Ninth Circuit had to
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prejudice" test, a courtroom practice that creates an "unacceptable risk of
impermissible factors coming into play" violates a defendant's constitution
right to a fair trial.29 The state appellate court concluded that the buttons
worn by the victim's family members during Musladin's jury trial were an
"impermissible factor coming into play." 30 The Ninth Circuit held that this
finding satisfied the "inherent prejudice" test and, therefore, Musladin's
constitutional rights were violated.3'
However, after finding the buttons to be an impermissible factor
coming into play, the state court went on to require Musladin to show that
the presence of the photograph buttons "branded [him] with an
unmistakable mark of guilt."32 The Ninth Circuit found that this additional
requirement was both contrary to, and an objectively unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law.33 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit overturned the district court's denial of Musladin's petition for writ
of habeas corpus and remanded the case for issuance of the writ.
34
The United States Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's
decision.35 In doing so, the Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit
abused its discretion in granting Musladin's petition for habeas relief.
36
The Supreme Court held that its previous decisions in Williams and Flynn
only concerned the effect of state-sponsored courtroom practices on a
criminal defendant's fair trial rights and did not address the effect of
spectator conduct. 37 Thus, the Supreme Court held that, absent clearly
established federal law on point with Musladin's case, the Ninth Circuit's
action was an improper exercise of authority.38
The three concurrences in Musladin raise several important issues.39
First, Justice Kennedy recognized the need to establish a new rule dealing
look at the state appellate court decision to determine if it applied the correct federal law (clearly
established federal law) and if the application was reasonable.
29. Id. at 656.
30. Id. at 658 (citing People v. Musladin, No. H015159, slip op. at 21-22 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 9, 1997)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 658 (citing Musladin, No. H015159, slip op. at 21-22).
33. Id. at 661.
34. Id.
35. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 75-76.
38. Id. at 77.
39. See United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 47 n.17 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[Defendant] cites
the statements contained [in Musladin] as indicia of the Supreme Court's concerns over the
potential for improper influence represented by the conduct of spectators. However, these
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with whether "buttons proclaiming a message relevant to the case ought to
be prohibited as a matter of course., 40  Second, Justice Stevens made the
argument that "there is no merit whatsoever to the suggestion that the First
Amendment may provide some measure of protection to spectators in a
courtroom who engage in actual or symbolic speech to express any point of
view about an ongoing proceeding."4 1 Most relevant, however, is Justice
Souter's concurrence, with which Justice Stevens essentially agreed.42
Justice Souter stated that, with regard to a defendant's fair trial rights, "the
trial judge has an affirmative obligation to control the courtroom and keep
it free of improper influence," whether such influence results from state-
sponsored or private spectator conduct.43 Souter went on to express serious
concerns about the effect of the photograph buttons on the fair trial rights
of the defendant,44 contending that
one could not seriously deny that allowing spectators at a criminal
trial to wear visible buttons with the victim's photo can raise a risk of
improper considerations. The display is no part of the evidence
concurrences focus on the impact that affirmative demonstrations by spectators (there, the
wearing of buttons by spectators that featured an image of the victim) may have during the guilt
phase of a trial." (citing Musladin, 549 U.S. at 78-83) (alteration in original)).
40. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 80-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 (1915) (courtroom disorder and mob violence), Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923),
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355 (1966) (the disruptive presence of the press in the
courtroom), and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550 (1965) (the presence of cameras in the
courtroom)). Justice Kennedy recognizes that it is an already well-settled rule that a court must
"order a new trial when a defendant shows his conviction has been obtained in a trial tainted by
an atmosphere of coercion or intimidation" caused by spectator or other courtroom conduct.
However, Kennedy distinguishes the potential impact of the photograph buttons from the
"coercion or intimidation" caused by courtroom conduct in previous Supreme Court cases. He
suggests that "the case as presented to us here does call for a new rule, perhaps justified as much
as a preventative measure as by the urgent needs of the situation. That rule should be explored in
the court system, and then established in this Court before it can be grounds for relief in [a habeas
corpus proceeding]." Id.
41. Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 81-83 (Souter, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Souter argues that the
standard established in Williams and Flynn, that a criminal defendant's fair trial rights are
infringed when a courtroom "practice or condition presents 'an unacceptable risk . .. of
impermissible factors coming into play' in the jury's consideration of the case," reaches spectator
conduct. Souter contends that while the photograph buttons present a risk of impermissible
factors being considered by the jury, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that such a risk
was unreasonable. He suggests that while it is unlikely that a First Amendment interest exists in
the photograph buttons, it would be preferable that the argument be fully developed before
deciding "whether protection of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised by
spectators' buttons." Id.
43. Id. at 82 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966)).
44. Id. at 82-83.
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going to guilt or innocence, and the buttons are at once an appeal for
sympathy for the victim (and perhaps for those who wear the
buttons) and a call for some response from those who see them. On
the jurors' part, that expected response could well seem to be a
verdict of guilty, and a sympathetic urge to assuage the grief or rage
of survivors with a conviction would be the paradigm of improper
consideration.45
B. United States Supreme Court's "Inherent Prejudice" Test
In Musladin, the Supreme Court held that it was improper for the
Ninth Circuit to grant Musladin's petition for writ of habeas corpus under
AEDPA because of the lack of any Supreme Court precedent on point with
46the issue raised by the case. The Court distinguished the precedent
established in Williams and Flynn on the ground that these cases deal with
the effect of state-sponsored courtroom activity, not spectator conduct, on
the defendant's fair trial rights.47 While at least one state court has done so,
the Supreme Court has not yet extended the holdings in Williams and Flynn
to cover the effect of spectator conduct 8
1. Estelle v. Williams
In Estelle v. Williams, the defendant, Harry Williams, was charged
with assault. 49 Throughout his state court jury trial, Williams appeared in
court wearing prison attire. 50 Neither Williams nor his counsel raised an
objection to the clothing.51 Williams appealed after he was convicted, and
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 2 Williams then sought
habeas relief in the United States district court. 3 The district court held
that although the forced wearing of prison garb was inherently unfair, it
amounted to a harmless error.54  Williams appealed to the Fifth Circuit
45. Id.
46. Id. at 77 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 75-76.
48. Id. at 76 ("[A]lthough the Court articulated the test for inherent prejudice that applies to
state conduct in [Estelle v.] Williams[, 425 U.S. 501 (1976),] and [Holbrook v.] Flynn[, 475 U.S.
560, 568 (1986)], we have never applied that test to spectators' conduct. Indeed, part of the legal
test of Williams and Flynn-asking whether the practices furthered an essential state interest-
suggests that those cases apply only to state-sponsored practices." (emphasis added)); see infra
section VI1.B.
49. Williams, 425 U.S. at 502.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 503.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Court of Appeals, which reversed the conviction on the ground that the
error was not harmless."s
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court overturned the Fifth
Circuit's decision, holding that, while the forced wearing of prison garb is
inherently prejudicial, and thus violates a defendant's constitutional right to
a fair trial, such conduct did not amount to an infringement of the
defendant's fair trial rights in the present case because neither Williams nor
his counsel ever objected to the forced wearing of the clothing.5 6 Courts
have consistently required that the defendant object to being tried in prison
garments before a constitutional violation will be found.57 The Court held
that, based on the lack of an objection by the defendant in this case, there
was insufficient evidence to prove that Williams was forced to wear the
prison clothing.58
In its analysis, the Williams Court held that a courtroom practice is
"inherently prejudicial," and thus violates a defendant's fair trial rights,
when "an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming
into play" and the practice "furthers no essential state policy. ' 59 The Court
found that compelling a defendant to stand trial in prison attire would serve
as a constant reminder of the defendant's status as an accused needing to be
held in custody, and such conduct would function as a continuous and
improper influence on the jury throughout the trial.6° In addition, such a
practice serves no compelling state interest, such as ensuring the safety of
others.61 Thus, the forced wearing of prison garb during trial is "inherently
prejudicial" and violates the defendant's fair trial rights.62
2. Holbrook v. Flynn
In Holbrook v. Flynn, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Williams in
determining whether the presence of uniformed officers violated the
defendants' right to a fair trial.63 The defendant, Charles Flynn, and five
co-defendants were charged with armed robbery.64 On the first day of
55. Id.
56. Id. at 512-13.
57. Id. at 508 ("Courts have therefore required an accused to object to being tried in jail
garments, just as he must invoke or abandon other rights.").
58. Id. at 512-13.
59. Id. at 504-05 (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965)).
60. Id. at 503-05.
61. Id at 505.
62. Id. at 512-13.
63. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-70 (1986).
64. Id. at 562.
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Flynn's jury trial, four uniformed troopers sat in the front row of the
spectators' section, immediately behind Flynn and his co-defendants.65
This was an "extraordinary" measure, not traditionally employed at
criminal proceedings.66 Flynn's counsel immediately objected to the
presence of the officers, arguing that "the presence of uniformed officers
would suggest to the jury that defendants were of 'bad character,"' in
violation of their fair trial rights.67 The trial court justice ruled that "in
view of the need for adequate security," the uniformed troopers could
remain.68  The trial proceeded with the uniformed officers present, and
Flynn was convicted.69
Flynn appealed his conviction to the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
where the conviction was upheld. 70 Flynn then sought habeas relief in the
federal district court, which also upheld the conviction. 71 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, reversed Flynn's conviction, finding that the
trial court failed to show why the particular circumstances surrounding
Flynn's trial called for such an "extraordinary" measure as the presence of
the uniformed troopers.72
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit,
holding that, under the Court's precedent in Williams, the presence of the
officers was not "inherently prejudicial," and, thus, the practice did not
violate the defendant's fair trial rights.73 The Court distinguished Flynn
from Williams in that the message sent by the security officers, unlike that
sent by the compelled wearing of prison garb, was far from clear.74 The
presence of the uniformed guards was just as likely to be construed as a
measure to protect against outside disruptions or eruptions of violence in
the courtroom as a sign that Flynn is particularly dangerous or guilty.75
Also, in contrast to the prison clothing in Williams, the officers served an
important state interest, mainly to maintain the custody of the defendants
and to insure there was adequate security in the courtroom. 76 Thus, Flynn's
65. Id.
66. Id. at 565.
67. Id. at 562-63.
68. Id. at 563.
69. Id. at 565.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 566.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 572.
74. Id. at 569.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 571-72.
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fair trial rights were not violated by the presence of the uniformed
officers."
Therefore, under Williams and Flynn, courtroom conduct infringes a
criminal defendant's constitutional fair trial rights if that particular category
of conduct has been held "inherently prejudicial" or if the defendant is able
to prove that the conduct has caused or will cause actual prejudice in the
case at bar.78  State-sponsored courtroom conduct has been held to be
"inherently prejudicial" where it creates an "unacceptable risk of
impermissible factors coming into play. ,79 However, the Supreme Court
has never extended the "inherent prejudice" test of Williams and Flynn to
determine if spectator courtroom conduct, including spectators bringing
photographs of the victim into the courtroom, violates a defendant's fair
trial rights. 80
C. State Court Decisions Addressing the Display of Victim Photos
Unlike the Supreme Court, a number of state courts have addressed
the issue of whether or not spectators' display of victim photographs
infringes on a defendant's constitutional fair trial rights. Some courts have
explicitly extended the "inherent prejudice" test established in Williams and
Flynn to analyze this issue, finding that such photographs do not violate the
defendant's fair trial rights.8' Other courts have reached the same
conclusion by finding no actual proof that the jurors were affected by such
photographs and, thus, no actual prejudice.82 Only a small number of trial
courts have excluded such photographs from the courtroom.
8 3
1. Decisions Applying Williams and Flynn to Spectator Conduct
Most recently, in State v. Lord, the Supreme Court of Washington
found that, under the "inherent prejudice" test of Williams and Flynn,
spectators wearing photograph buttons of the victim during the defendant's
criminal jury trial did not violate the defendant's fair trial rights.84 The
Court held that under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Musladin, state appellate courts are expressly allowed to determine and
77. Id. at 572.
78. A defendant's fair trial rights may be impaired by either a showing of actual or inherent
prejudice. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976); see also Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570.
79. Williams, 425 U.S. at 505; Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570.
80. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006).
81. See, e.g., State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
82. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000).
83. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
84. Lord, 165 P.3d at 1259.
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follow their own constitutional precedent regarding spectator conduct.
85
However, previously in In re Woods, the Supreme Court of Washington
applied the "inherent prejudice" test of Williams and Flynn to spectator
conduct in the courtroom. 86 Thus, in Lord, the Washington Supreme Court
analyzed the constitutionality of the presence of spectators wearing
photograph buttons of the victim under the "inherent prejudice" test.
87
The majority in Lord emphasized that the photograph buttons were
nothing more than "a silent showing of sympathy or affiliation in the
courtroom., 88 The court found that "[a] simple photograph button, a sign
of support or sympathy that does not expressly advocate guilt or innocence,
does not alone impermissibly bias a jury."89 However, as discussed later in
this Note, photographs of the victim do present a great risk of biasing a jury
against a defendant.
Justice Chambers, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued
that photograph buttons are a form of expression and communication, and
allowing photograph buttons in the courtroom is "to allow courtroom
85. Id. at 1258.
86. Id. at 1258-59 (citing In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607 (Wash. 2005)). In Woods, the
Supreme Court of Washington used the "inherent prejudice" test of Williams and Flynn to
determine if spectator conduct, namely the wearing of orange and black ribbons, violated a
defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In re Woods, 114 P.3d at 616. The court
held that the spectator's ribbons did not create an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors
coming into play because the ribbons did "not express any conclusion about Woods's guilt or
innocence." Id. Thus, Woods's right to a fair trial was not violated by the presence of the
spectators' ribbons in the courtroom. Id. at 617.
In Woods, the Supreme Court of Washington summarized several other state court decisions
applying Flynn to spectator conduct. The Woods court noted the following:
Many courts have used the Holbrook [Flynn] standard and have found that no inherent
prejudice exists so as to taint the defendant's right to fair trial from the wearing of
buttons or other displays. See, e.g., Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 389 (Fla. 1998)
(spectators holding up victim's picture was not inherently prejudicial); Pachl v. Zenon,
929 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Or. 1996) (spectators wearing buttons with inscription "Crime
Victims United" was not prejudicial and counsel was not ineffective for failing to
challenge the issue); State v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 177 (N.C. 1996) (spectators
wearing badges with victim's picture on them was not prejudicial). In most cases
involving violent crime, there is at least one grieving family present at the trial and the
presence of such persons should not come as any surprise to the jury members. See,
e.g., State v. Richey, 298 S.E.2d 879, 889 (W. Va. 1982) ("We must assume that a jury
has the fortitude to withstand this type of public scrutiny, and cannot presume
irreparable harm to the defendant's right to a fair jury trial by the presence of spectators
who may have some type of associational identity with the victim of the crime.").
Id.
87. Lord, 165 P.3d at 1255. On the third day of Lord's jury trial, the court "expressed
concern that the buttons might invoke undue sympathy from the jury," and, on the fourth day, the
court ordered the buttons removed. Id.
88. Id. at 1256.
89. Id. at 1253-54.
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spectators to present a planned, organized effort to communicate with-and
sway-the jury."90 Such participation in the trial on the part of spectators
is "abhorrent to a fair and impartial trial." 9  Based on these findings,
Chambers logically contended that, "[i]n my view, signs, logos, and
buttons with pictures have no place in a courtroom during a trial." 92
In Lord, the Washington Supreme Court, like the United States
Supreme Court in Musladin, expressly recognized the "important
distinction between the potential impact of a 'state-sponsored' message and
a message from private citizens." 93 The court found there should be more
leniency in the analysis of private spectator courtroom conduct because,
unlike state sponsored conduct, spectator conduct is more likely to be
94understood by the jury as a private expression.
2. State Court Decisions Allowing Photographs Without Applying "Inherent
Prejudice" Test of Williams and Flynn
A number of other state courts have addressed the issue of the effect
of victim photographs on a criminal defendant's fair trial rights without
explicitly applying the "inherent prejudice" test of Williams and Flynn.
95
Instead of looking to whether there was "an unacceptable risk of
impermissible factors coming into play," the courts in these cases have
looked to whether or not there was actual proof that the jury had seen and
been affected by the presence of the photographs. 96  Absent such a
showing, the courts held that the defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial had not been impaired by the presence of such photographs.
90. Id. at 1265 (Chambers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 1264 ("The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will
be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print." (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462
(1907))).
92. Id. at 1265.
93. Id. at 1254 (majority opinion).
94. Id.
95. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1986); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570
(1986).
96. See, e.g., Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570 (citing Williams, 425 U.S. at 505). In Flynn, the Court
held that a violation of a defendant's constitutional fair trial rights may be found upon a showing
of either actual or inherent prejudice. Id. Absent a showing of actual prejudice, a defendant's
right to a fair trial may nonetheless be infringed by conduct that is inherently prejudicial. Id.
"Whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial.., the question must
be not whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but rather
whether 'an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play."' Id.
However, in a number of state court decisions concerning the effect of courtroom spectators
displaying the victim's photograph during the defendant's criminal jury trial, the courts focus
primarily on whether or not a finding of actual prejudice can be shown. Id.
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In Johnson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
courtroom spectators wearing buttons displaying the victim's photograph
did not violate the defendant's fair trial rights. 97 The court found that there
was no actual evidence that any of the jurors saw the photographs, and thus
there was no merit to the argument that the photographs improperly
influenced the jury and impaired the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial
by an impartial jury.98 Similarly, in State v. Braxton, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that spectators wearing badges containing a
photograph of the victim did not violate the defendant's fair trial rights,
finding no evidence in the record showing that the jurors even noticed the
photographs or knew that they were photographs of the victim. 99 In neither
of these cases did the courts look to whether there was an "unacceptable
risk" that the photographs may have come into play; rather, they looked to
the absence of actual evidence showing that the photographs did influence
the jury in any way.
In State v. Bradford, the Supreme Court of Kansas found that
photographs of the victim did not violate a defendant's constitutional right
to a fair trial. 100 In support, the court stressed that the defendant failed to
provide evidence that any of the jurors saw or were influenced by the
buttons. 10 1  In Buckner v. State, the defendant argued that spectators
displaying photographs of the victim during his criminal jury trial
amounted to extrajudicial evidence that "created undue sympathy which
warranted a mistrial."' 12 The record showed that two of the jurors did in
fact see the photographs, but both jurors stated that the photographs would
not influence their decision in any way. 10 3 The Supreme Court of Florida
held that there was "no reasonable possibility that the jury's brief exposure
to the pictures may have changed the outcome of the proceeding," and thus
the pictures did not deprive the defendant of his fair trial rights.'0 4
97. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 781-82 (Va. 2000). In Johnson, upon
defense counsel's objection to the presence of the photograph buttons, the trial court ordered that
"spectators would not be permitted to display the buttons in any manner that would allow the
jurors to see them" and that "anyone wearing a button was required to refrain from any contact
with any of the jurors." Id.
98. Id.
99. State v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 176-77 (N.C. 1996).
100. State v. Bradford, 864 P.2d 680, 686-87 (Kan. 1993).
101. Id. at 687.
102. Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 388-89 (Fla. 1998).
103. Id. at 389.
104. Id. The Buckner court did note that "[u]nder certain circumstances, prejudicial
exhibition of emotion may deprive a defendant of a fair trial." Id. (citing Woods v. Dugger, 923
F.2d 1454 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
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In State v. Speed, the Supreme Court of Kansas refused to find that
photographs of the victim displayed by spectators in the courtroom during
the defendant's criminal jury trial violated the defendant's fair trial
rights.'0 5 The court found that the record failed to show any "evidence that
the jurors were in any way affected" by the photographs. 10 6 However, the
court went on to state "it would seem that the wearing of [pictures by the
spectators] is not a good idea because of the possibility of prejudice which
might result."'
0 7
These state court rulings suggest that, in some states, a defendant must
show actual evidence that the jurors were influenced by, or at the least saw,
the photographs of the victim in order to find that the defendant's
constitutional rights have been impaired.'0 8 Absent such a showing, many
state courts have held that the defendant has not been deprived of the right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury. This standard requires a higher showing
than the "inherent prejudice" test of William and Flynn and, therefore, is
less protective of the criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment fair trial rights.
3. Decisions Prohibiting Photographs
Only a few state courts have prevented spectators from displaying
photographs of the victim during a criminal jury trial. For example, in
State v. Henriques, a New Jersey court case, members of the victim's
family sought an order allowing them to wear buttons depicting a
photograph of the victim during the defendant's criminal jury trial.'0 9 The
trial judge denied the motion, and the family members appealed the
decision. 10 Similarly, in the Nico Contreas murder trial in Illinois state
court, the trial judge ruled that spectators could not display photographs of
105. State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 29-30 (Kan. 1998).
106. Id. at 30.
107. Id.
108. E.g., Cagle v. State, 6 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (no evidence in record that
demonstrated jury saw badges being worn by some spectators or, if they did, that it affected their
ability to be fair jurors); Kenyon v. State, 946 S.W.2d 705, 710-11 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (no
evidence that jurors were prejudiced by spectators wearing badges); Nguyen v. State, 977 S.W.2d
450, 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (no evidence in record to show spectators wearing buttons was
prejudicial).
109. See New Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center Website: New Jersey Cases, Brief Library-
Photograph of Victim, http://www.njcvlc.org/reference/brief/download.php?id= 17%27.
110. See New Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center Website, http://www.njcvlc.org/reference/
brief/download.php?id= 16'.
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the victim during the defendant's jury trial.1 1' In a subsequent newspaper
article, one of the spectators admitted the purpose of the buttons was that
she "want[ed] the jury to be confronted with [the victim's] memory," and
she "doesn't want anyone to forget it was an innocent little boy.""' 2 The
trial court correctly recognized the inappropriate impact such photographs
could have on the defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial by an impartial
jury by "tug[ging] on jurors' heart strings and therefore potentially
affect[ing] the outcome."' '
13
Apart from the occasional trial court decision blocking spectators from
displaying photographs of the victim during a defendant's criminal jury
trial, trial court judges generally allow spectators to display such
photographs. On appeal, such trial court decisions are nearly always
upheld, either under the "inherent prejudice" standard of William and Flynn
or by a finding that there is no evidence that the jurors were actually aware
of, or influenced by, the victim photographs. 14 State court judges fail to
recognize the extent of the influence victim photographs may have on the
jury, instead finding them to be nothing more than an ordinary showing of
support for, and solidarity with, a deceased victim.
II. Constitutional Fair Trial Rights
The Sixth Amendment provides the accused with certain rights during
a criminal trial. Included in these rights is the right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. Such rights must be zealously enforced to ensure a fair
prosecution and protect citizens against "illegal and immoral conduct [on
the part] of the government,"'"15 as well the integrity of the criminal justice
system. 116
A. Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
I 11. Dave Parro, Can Victim Pictures Influence a Jury?, BEACON BLOG,
http://blogs.suburbanchicagonews.com/beaconblog/2007/08/can-victim-pictures-influence- .ht
ml (Aug. 13, 2007, 09:55 CST).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
115. HAMID R. KUSHA, DEFENDANT RIGHTS 50 (2004); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (fair trial rights protect against "arbitrary law enforcement").
116. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 574 (1980) (stating that
"justice must satisfy appearance of justice" (quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616
(1960))).
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a... trial, by an impartial jury .... Embedded in this principle is the
right to a presumption of innocence and the right to have one's "guilt or
innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at
trial, and not on ... other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial."
'' 18
Therefore, criminal defendants have the right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury in federal court.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." ' 19 Under this clause, the provisions of the Bill of Rights
that are "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" apply to the states. 120 In
Duncan v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he
deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal
cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must
therefore be respected by the States."' 21 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings has been held to apply to the
states. 122
Even before the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is
entitled to a jury trial in state court under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court recognized the importance of impaneling an
impartial jury when a jury is used. The Court held that where the right to a
jury trial is provided in state court, this right "guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors."'123 The
failure to provide such a panel of impartial jurors "violates even the
minimal standards of due process."'
124
In Taylor v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court of the United reversed a
criminal defendant's conviction on the grounds that the defendant's right to
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
118. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
121. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
122. KUSHA, supra note 115, at 28. (noting that many state constitutions already included the
right to a jury trial prior to the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment as against the states).
123. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72, (1965) (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
722 (1961)).
124. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927)); see also Turner, 379 U.S. at 471-72.
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a fair trial was violated. 125 The Court held that the prosecution's remarks
during opening and closing statements, combined with the trial court's
failure to adequately instruct the jury, "created a genuine danger that the
jury would convict [the defendant] on the basis of those extraneous
considerations, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial. 126 The fact
that "extraneous, negative circumstance ... may have influenced the jury's
deliberations" was in violation of the defendant's fair trial rights under the
Constitution.127 Thus, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment require that an
accused in a serious criminal proceeding, whether in state or federal court,
receive a fair trial by an impartial jury. 128  Even where a jury trial is
provided, if the jury is not impartial due to potential bias or outside factors
influencing its decision, the defendant's fair trial rights are violated.
III. Importance of Protecting Rights to a Fair Trial
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has reiterated the
importance that the right to a fair trial serves in our criminal justice system.
However, the importance of affording criminal defendants a fair trial is not
limited to the United States, but is generally a universally accepted
proposition. For example, the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights has
held that
[t]he right to a fair trial is a norm of international human rights law
designed to protect individuals from the unlawful and arbitrary
curtailment or deprivation of other basic rights and freedoms, the
most prominent of which are the right to life and liberty of the
person. It is guaranteed under Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provides that
"everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."'
' 29
125. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978).
126. Id. at 487-88.
127. Id. at 487 n.15.
128. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (noting that under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to a fair trial
by an impartial jury).
129. LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT IS A FAIR TRIAL: A BASIC GUIDE TO
LEGAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICE, (2000) (citing G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., 1496th plen. mtg. (Dec. 16, 1966)), available at http://humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/
descriptions/fair trial.pdf. The Lawyers Committee on Human Rights further states that "[t]he
fundamental importance of this right is illustrated not only by the extensive body of interpretation
it has generated but, most recently, by a proposal to include it in the non-derogable rights
provided for in Article 4(2) of the ICCPR." Id.
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In addition, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has found
that the right to a fair trial "is a fundamental safeguard to ensure that
individuals are protected from unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of their
human rights and freedoms, most importantly of the right to liberty and
security of person. It is an important aspect of the rights which enable
effective functioning of the administration of justice." 30 The important
interests protected by the right to a fair trial, including the protection of
individual liberty against arbitrary government action, are essential to
maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system.
IV. Spectators Displaying Victim Photographs in the
Courtroom Violates the Defendant's Rights to a Fair Trial
Photographs of the victim displayed in the courtroom violate a
defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial. Such
photographs go beyond an ordinary showing of emotion by the spectators,
and, in addition, victim photographs serve as a means of eliciting sympathy
from the jurors and encouraging the jurors to vindicate the loss of the
victim. In turn, victim photographs potentially bias the jurors and
encourage them to reach a verdict on grounds other than the evidence
presented at trial, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
A. Scientific Research Regarding Sympathy and Assessments of Guilt
Scientific research suggests that victim photographs may serve to
influence a juror's decision regarding the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Although there is no study dealing directly with the effect of
victim photographs on a juror's assessment of the defendant's guilt in a
criminal jury trial, studies suggest that emotions, including sympathy, have
an effect on juror decision making. 131 In general, victim photographs
displayed by spectators during a criminal defendant's jury trial serve as a
constant reminder that the victim was a real person, someone's friend or
family, and the loss of the victim occasions sympathy from the jurors.
32
This sympathy, in turn, makes the jurors more likely to view the defendant
130. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, http://www.legislationline.org/
topics/topic/8 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
131. See infra note 137.
132. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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as guilty, in part because they feel the need to do something to vindicate the
suffering of the spectators and the loss of the victim. 1
33
A study by Stuart Fischoff suggests that victim reminders, including
photographs of the victim, displayed during a criminal jury trial had a
statistically significant impact on the public's perception of the defendant's
guilt.1 34 Fischoff found that such reminders serve to remind the public that
"real persons, not vague abstractions, were victimized," and increased the
public's perception of the defendant's guilt.' 35 Although Fischoff's study
deals with the public in general, it lends support to the contention that
victim photographs elicit sympathy above and beyond what would
normally occur at the trial from those who perceive them. It also suggests
that if such sympathy has an influential effect on the public's perception of
the defendant's guilt, it may also have an influential effect on the jurors'
136perception.
A study by Barbara Reskin highlights the impact of extralegal
variables, including the jury's perception of the victim, on the jury's
decision making. 37  Reskin found that extralegal variables have a
statistically significant effect on the juror's verdict, especially in trials
where the case against the defendant is weak. 38 However, such extralegal
factors are not part of the evidence introduced at trial, and thus, allowing
such factors to influence the jury's decision is contrary to the criminal
defendant's constitutional fair trial rights.
More recently, Neal Feigenson and Jaihyun Park conducted a research
review on the effects of emotion on judgments of legal responsibility. 39 In
their review, Feigenson and Park discussed several different ways in which
133. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
134. Stuart Fischoff, Influence of Victim Reminders on Public Perception of Guilt or Non-
Guilt in a Celebrity Murder Trial, 2 J. MEDIA PSYCHOL. 4 (1996). While Fischoff s study
focuses on the effect of victim reminders in celebrity criminal cases, mainly the O.J. Simpson
trial, Fischoff notes that "the notion of victim reminders is relevant to all civil or criminal trials."
Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Fischoff recognizes that "the impact of victim reminders on how the public judges
the guilt of a [defendant] and how actual jurors may judge [a defendant] can only be the subject
of conjecture. The array of information available to a jury and the context of their judgment are
dramatically different than for that of the public." Id. However, the fact that victim photographs
influence the public's perception of the defendant's guilt or innocence lends some support to the
contention that victim photographs influence a juror's perception of guilt or innocence. Id.
137. See generally Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and
Extralegal Factors in Jurors' Decisions, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 423 (1986).
138. Id.
139. See generally Neal Feigenson & Jaihyun Park, Emotions and Attributions of Legal
Responsibility and Blame: A Research Review, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143 (2006).
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emotions can influence a juror's assessment of the defendant's innocence
or guilt. They noted that a juror's emotional response to the victim
influenced decision making in criminal cases. 140  More precisely, they
found that in several studies, the research indicates that greater sympathy
for the injured party made the jurors more likely to find the defendant
blameworthy.14 ' Therefore, photographs of the victim, which function to
elicit sympathy on behalf of the victims, are likely to influence the jurors'
perception of the defendant's guilt.
142
In addition, Feigenson and Park noted that the jurors must be aware of
such bias, be aware of the magnitude and direction of the bias, be
motivated to correct the bias, and be able to adjust their responses
accordingly in order to eliminate the effect of juror bias created by
emotions. 143  They found that often "[l]egal decision makers may fail to
satisfy any or all of these criteria." 144 Thus, "the research suggests that the
affective influences on judgments of legal responsibility and blame are
likely to persist in real legal settings." 145  Therefore, even where courts
140. Id. at 153.
141. Id. (explaining that in a products liability lawsuit, the more sympathetic mock jurors
were to an injured plaintiff, the more likely they were to find the defendant liable). Professors
Feigenson and Park note that Bornstein found that "[fleelings aroused by a severe injury appear to
operate by producing a specific motivation [in jurors] to alleviate the injured party's suffering or,
to a somewhat lesser extent, to punish the defendant." (citing Brian H. Bornstein, The Effect of
Injury Severity on Mock Jurors' Liability Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1477, 1485,
1493 (1998))); Brian H. Bornstein, David, Goliath, and Reverend Bayes: Prior Beliefs About
Defendants' Status in Personal Injury Cases, 8 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 233 (1994)
(nothing that in a comparative negligence case, jurors who feel more sympathy for an accident
victim are more inclined to hold the defendant more responsible).
142. See sources cited supra note 141.
143. Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 117 (1994);
Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 185 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
144. Feigenson & Park, supra note 139 (citing Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering Into the Bias
Blind Spot: People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. BULL. 680 (2005); Wilson et al., supra note 143; Kerry Edwards & Tamara S. Bryan,
Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional
Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 849 (1997); Berkowitz et al., On the
Correction of Feeling-Induced Judgmental Bias, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF
AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION 131 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2002)).
145. Feigenson & Park, supra note 139, at 143 (citing Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog
and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV.
814 (2001); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro and
Bloom, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 197 (2003); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology
of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556 (2000)). However, Feigenson and Park note that there may
be some support for the contention that, for certain individuals in certain situations, the influence
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instruct the jury to disregard victim photographs in the courtroom in
assessing the guilt or innocence of the defendant, it is unlikely that such
instructions will be effective. 1
46
In a different article on sympathy and legal judgment, Professor
Feigenson argues that we should not encourage sympathy in legal decision
making. 47 Feigenson defines sympathy as "a heightened awareness of the
suffering of another and the urge to alleviate that suffering," and he notes
"both the causes and the effects of sympathy yield unfairly biased
decisions.' 48 Feigenson cites research indicating "sympathy and impartial
justice may conflict.'
149
Spectators displaying photographs of the victim during a criminal jury
trial are a continuous reminder to the jury of the reality of the loss of the
victim and the suffering of those who cared about the victim. Thus, these
photographs function to elicit sympathy in the jurors. Scientific studies
have shown that such sympathy is inconsistent with obtaining a fair trial by
an impartial jury, rendering the jurors more likely to perceive the defendant
as guilty and more likely to convict in order to vindicate the loss of the
victim and the spectator's suffering. This infringes the defendant's Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment right to have guilt determined "solely on the
basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on ... other circumstances
not adduced as proof at trial."'
B. Victim Photographs Are Especially Prejudicial in Self-Defense Cases
Photographs of the victim influence a jury in a number of ways.
Victim photographs are especially prejudicial, however, to defendants in
self-defense cases because they often serve to directly contradict the
defendant's arguments at trial but are not properly admitted as evidence in
the case.
For example, in Musladin, the defendant admitted to shooting the
victim, but argued that his actions were taken in self-defense.' 5' The
defendant had to convince the jury that the victim was the initial
of emotions on the legal decision makers' judgments may not be as intractable as Haidt and
Alicke contend. Feigenson & Park, supra note 139, at 143.
146. See sources cited supra note 141.
147. Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN.
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1997).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 49 (citing C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism:
When Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1042, 1042
(1995)).
150. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
151. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 72 (2006).
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aggressor. 52 In such a case, victim photographs are especially prejudicial
to the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial because they often
portray the victim in an innocent light.153 This may make it more difficult
for the jury to perceive the victim as an aggressor, undermining the
defendant's self-defense claim. 154 Therefore, although victim photographs
in the courtroom interfere with a defendant's rights to a fair trial in all
criminal jury trials, they are particularly prejudicial in self-defense cases.
V. The First Amendment
The First Amendment prohibits the government from "abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'
155
This right has been incorporated as against the states.
A. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Spectators Who Display
Buttons
Although the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the public's
right to attend a criminal trial, courts have frequently found that this right is
implicit in the First Amendment. 156 The Supreme Court has reasoned that
"[w]ithout the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised
for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press
'could be eviscerated."",157  Obviously, spectators who attend a criminal
jury trial will, on occasion, exhibit emotions. This is an unavoidable result
of the right of public access to the courtroom. Several courts have
152. Id.
153. A picture of the photograph button at issue in Musladin is available at
http://www.daylife.com/photo/050E49V9nbzf. The victim photographs at issue in the Illinois
state court case addressed above are available at http://blogs.suburbanchicagonews.com/
beaconblog/2007/08/can victim pictures_influence_ .html.
154. See, e.g., Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 660 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The primary issue
at Musladin's trial was whether it was the defendant or the deceased individual who was the
aggressor. The buttons essentially 'argue' that Studer was the innocent party and that the
defendant was necessarily guilty; that the defendant, not Studer, was the initiator of the attack,
and, thus, the perpetrator of a criminal act.").
155. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
156. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-80 (1980)
(recognizing that although great caution must be used in reading unenumerated rights into the
Constitution, the right to attend a criminal trial is implicit in the enumerated rights of the First
Amendment, including the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly).
157. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
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acknowledged that such ordinary expressions of emotion are not
prejudicial.
158
However, victim photographs go beyond an "ordinary showing of
emotion" and, as discussed above, function as a continuous and extreme
reminder to the jurors of the loss of the victim and the suffering endured by
the spectators displaying such photographs. Because victim photographs
function to send a message to the jury, they are the equivalent of speech
that participates in the criminal proceeding.
In his concurrence in Musladin, Justice Stevens recognized the lack of
First Amendment protection for the participatory role that victim
photographs play in a criminal jury trial. In response to Souter's contention
that "an interest in protected expression on the part of the spectators
wearing mourners' buttons has been raised," 159 Stevens argued that "there
is no merit whatsoever to the suggestion that the First Amendment may
provide some measure of protection to spectators in a courtroom who
engage in actual or symbolic speech to express any point of view about an
ongoing proceeding., 160 Because spectators display of victim photographs
in the courtroom amounts to participatory conduct, such photographs are
not protected under the First Amendment.
B. First Amendment Right Must Yield to Sixth Amendment
In addition, even if there is some First Amendment protection for
spectator displays of victim photographs inside the courtroom, the First
Amendment right is not absolute and must yield to the defendant's Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial.' 6' In Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
"rights of access may be curtailed where there are sufficiently powerful
countervailing considerations. ' 162 The Court has recognized that limiting
158. See, e.g., Burns v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 604-55 (Fla. 1992) (victim's wife crying three
times during defendant's criminal jury trial was not a prejudicial showing of emotion); see also
State v. Chaney, 169 Ohio App. 3d 246, 251-52 (Ohio Ct. App 2006).
159. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 83 (2006) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
160. Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
161. See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing the superiority of
defendant's constitutional fair trial rights over spectators' first amendment rights of access (citing
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564)); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 629 (1978) (suggesting that the rights of access to court proceedings, as
guaranteed by the first amendment, are only limited by a defendant's constitutional fair trial
rights). In Norris, the court held that "[wihere fair trial rights are at significant risk, however, the
first amendment rights of trial attendees can and must be curtailed at the courthouse door." Id. at
832.
162. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18.
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access to the courtroom during a criminal proceeding may be appropriate
where the closure is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'
63
Here, the government has a compelling interest in ensuring that the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is not
violated. In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the
importance of the defendant's fair trial rights as against the First
Amendment right to access, acknowledging that where such rights conflict,
the First Amendment right must yield. 164 In addition, prohibiting victim
photographs from the courtroom during a criminal proceeding is narrowly
tailored, targeting only the prejudicial conduct while continuing to allow
spectators access to the courtroom. 
165
VI. State Interest in Allowing Victim Photographs
In addition to the potential First Amendment protection for spectators
displaying photographs of the victim inside the courtroom, the state may
have other interests in allowing such photographs. In particular, the state
may have an interest in allowing supporters of the victim a forum to
express the emotions associated with their loss and to show their solidarity
with the victim. Traditionally, victims and supporters of victims have had
a very minimal, if any, role in the criminal justice process. 166 Even in light
of the Victims' Rights Movement, which sought to provide victims with an
increased role in criminal prosecutions, states currently provide such
individuals with varying degrees of involvement in the prosecution of
crimes. 167 The state may have a legitimate interest in providing victims and
victim supporters with an outlet to express their emotions and solidarity in
the criminal justice system, which may function to help repair the harm
caused to the individuals and society by the commission of a crime.
168
163. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)
(citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S.
97, 101-03 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
164. Norris, 918 F.2d at 832 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564).
165. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
166. See, e.g., Debbie Selinsky, In Pursuit of Restorative Justice, 7 DIVINITY 1 (2001),
available at http://www.divinity.duke.edu/publications/2007.09/features/feature3/print-feature3.
htm ("When I began working with the families of murder victims ... I found that there is really
no outlet for sharing their stories and expressing the pain of their loss.").
167. Christa Obold-Eshleman, Note, Victims' Rights and the Danger of Domestication of the
Restorative Justice Process, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 571, 584 (2004).
168. Id. at 587 (citing Kent Roach, Due Process And Victims' Rights: The New Law and
Politics of Criminal Justice 28, 35 (1999)).
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Allowing victim photographs to be displayed in the courtroom is one
possible means of accomplishing this objective.
However, as discussed earlier in this Note, allowing spectators to
display victim photographs in the courtroom during a criminal jury trial
violates a defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial. These rights are
essential to maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system, 169 and
the trial judge has a responsibility to ensure that these rights are not
infringed during a criminal jury trial. 170 In addition, the sole purpose of a
criminal trial is to "determine whether the prosecution has established the
guilt of the accused as required by law, and the trial judge should not allow
the proceedings to be used for any other purpose." 171 Using the criminal
trial as an outlet for expression of victims and their supporters is
inappropriate. Thus, even in light of any potential interests in allowing
such photographs, spectators must be prohibited from displaying
photograph of the victim inside the courtroom during a criminal jury trial.
VII. Options for Rules
A. Maintain the Status Quo
One option for the Supreme Court would be to maintain the status quo
and not establish a rule dealing with effect of spectator conduct on the
victim's fair trial rights. By not ruling on the issue, the Supreme Court
allows state courts to continue to apply their own standard in analyzing the
effect of victim photographs in the courtroom on a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial.
However, this option does not sufficiently protect a criminal
defendant's rights to a fair trial. As discussed above, state courts have
applied varying standards in determining whether victim photographs
infringe on a criminal defendant's rights to a fair trial. The majority of
courts ruling on the issue have underestimated the influence of victim
photographs, allowing such photographs to be displayed by spectators in
169. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 574.
170. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 489 n.17 (1978) (citing THE ABA PROJECT
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 1.1(a) (App. Draft
1972)) ("The trial judge has the responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and
the interests of the public in the administration of criminal justice. The adversary nature of the
proceedings does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation of raising on his own initiative, at all
appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly promote a just
determination of the trial. The only purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the
prosecution has established the guilt of the accused as required by law, and the trial judge should
not allow the proceedings to be used for any other purpose.").
171. Id.
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the courtroom during a criminal jury trial.' 72 And, if the Supreme Court
fails to establish a rule dealing with the effects of spectator conduct on a
criminal defendant's rights to a fair trial, then under the AEDPA standard
of review, federal courts are precluded from granting relief on collateral
review to a defendant whose rights are violated by the presence of victim
photographs in the courtroom.1
73
B. Adopt the Williams and Flynn "Inherent Prejudice" Standard
Another option is for the Supreme Court to extend the "inherent
prejudice" test established in Williams and Flynn to cover not only state
sponsored courtroom activities, but also spectator activities. Under this
approach, a court would look to whether spectators displaying victim
photographs in the courtroom create "an unacceptable risk of impermissible
factors coming into play."'
174
As seen in State v. Lord and many other cases where this test was
applied, the inherent prejudice test does not provide adequate protection for
criminal defendant's fair trial rights. 75 In analyzing the effect of victim
photographs displayed in the courtroom under the inherent prejudice test,
the majority of state courts have allowed victim photographs into the
courtroom during a criminal proceeding. 76 As discussed above, allowing
such photographs violates the defendant's fair trial rights.
However, such an approach would be better than maintaining the
status quo. In applying the inherent prejudice test to spectator conduct, the
Supreme Court would authorize federal courts to grant relief under AEDPA
to defendants whose constitutional fair trial rights have been violated by
spectators displaying victim photographs during the criminal jury trial.
AEDPA requires such Supreme Court precedent before a federal court can
reverse a state court decision on the grounds that the state court decision
was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," clearly established
federal law.177 Currently, as displayed in Musladin, absent such Supreme
Court precedent, federal courts do not have the authority to review state
172. See supra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2007). Under the first prong of AEDPA, a federal court can
grant relief from a state court decision only where the state court decision was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States." Id.
174. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568
(1986).
175. See, e.g., State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
176. Id.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2007).
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court decisions regarding the effect of spectator conduct on a defendant's
right to a fair trial. 1
78
C. Prohibit Spectators From Displaying Victim Photographs in the
Courtroom
Finally, the Supreme Court could adopt an outright rule prohibiting
spectators from displaying victim photographs inside the courtroom during
a criminal jury trial. Upon hearing the issue on direct appeal, the Court
could rule that prohibiting the display of victim photographs in the
courtroom is necessary to ensure the defendant's constitutional fair trial
rights and, thus, required under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
79
In light of the division among lower courts as to the role of victim
photographs in the courtroom, such a rule is necessary to provide
clarification on the issue.' 80 In addition, prohibiting such photographs
would not infringe the First Amendment right of courtroom spectators.'
8'
Therefore, adopting such a rule would be the best approach to dealing with
spectators displaying photographs of victims in the courtroom during a
criminal jury trial.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue of when
spectator conduct during a criminal jury trial-such as spectators
displaying photographs of the victim-violates the defendant's fair trial
rights. In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, state courts have
generally allowed spectators to display such victim photographs. Absent
Supreme Court precedent on point, AEDPA precludes federal courts from
reviewing such decisions on collateral attack.1
82
178. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).
179. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
180. S. Brannon Latimer, Note, Due Process-Habeas Review and Outside Influences on the
Jury--the Ninth Circuit Holds That Buttons Depicting the Victim ' Photo, Worn by Immediate
Family During Murder Trial, Pose an Unacceptable Risk of Impermissible Influence on the Jury
Under Clearly Established Law, 59 S.M.U. L. REv. 395, 403 (2006) ("The Musladin decision
raises important questions about the constitutional limitations of spectator influence at trial. Here
lies a delicate balance of constitutional guarantees. On one hand is the [Sixth and] Fourteenth
Amendment[s] and the right to a fair trial free from outside influences. On the other are the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a public trial and the First Amendment's protection of free expression.
Scholars and courts alike are divided on the proper solution, and the Supreme Court should bring
clarity to this area by articulating guidelines for trial judges.").
181. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
182. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77.
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However, photographs of the victim in the courtroom during a
criminal defendant's jury trial impair the ability of the defendant to receive
a fair trial by an impartial jury. Scientific evidence shows that such
photographs serve to elicit sympathy from the jurors by making the loss of
the victim more real, and this sympathy, in turn, makes the jury more likely
to judge the defendant as blameworthy or guilty.'83 Also, jurors may feel
the need to vindicate the loss of the victim by convicting someone, whether
or not they truly believe the defendant is guilty of the charged crime.
Victim photographs play an especially strong role in self-defense cases,
where such photographs can directly contradict the defendant's arguments
in the case. Thus, photographs of the victim in the courtroom during a
criminal jury trial impair the defendant's constitutional right to receive a
fair trial by an impartial jury.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments provide certain protections for
a criminal defendant. These rights are essential to protecting the
defendant's life and liberty and maintain the integrity of the criminal justice
system; therefore, they must be zealously protected. In order to ensure that
the criminal defendant receives a fair trial by an impartial jury, as required
under the Constitution, the Supreme Court should adopt a rule prohibiting
spectators from displaying photographs of the victim during a defendant's
criminal jury trial. If the Court is not willing to adopt such a rule in all
criminal jury trials, it should, at the least, adopt a rule prohibiting victim
photographs during criminal jury trials in which the defendant is arguing
self-defense, as victim photographs are particularly prejudicial in such
cases.
183. See supra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
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